History : Time Line : Spion Kop - 24th January 1900

In conference with Sir Charles Warren and the other Generals, the Commander of the Natal Army urged that the Boer entrenchments, by this time cut deeply into the sides of the Rangeworthy Hills, should be attacked by night from our left, then resting on Bastion Hill. The Generals opposed this as being too dangerous, not, it appears, that they feared an unsuccessful issue, but rather that, should they succeed, they would not be sufficiently strong to hold the whole position. The second proposal was to attack Spion Kop from our right. General Buller ordered that either alternative was to be attempted at once. The first preferably, failing that the second, but he shrank from having his own plans or what he considered best being put into execution. Crudely stated the order was advance or retire. Sir Charles Warren’s plan was to destroy the entrenchment and demoralize the Boers by a continuous long-range and high-angle Artillery fire, but the officer in chief command was impatient of delay, and this proposal was put aside. The safety of the troops perched on the ridges in front of the Boer position may have been as dangerous as he stated, though up to this period of the war there was nothing to justify these fears as they had so far clung to their entrenchments; or it may be that he wished to relieve the minds of the people at home, who were beginning to ask when would something be done to retrieve the reverses in the field of the “black week” of December, his own reputation as a commander, or a pressing anxiety to succor the gallant soldiers shut up in Ladysmith. It is a fair assumption that each of these causes contributed in influencing General Sir Redvers Buller to urge that immediate and quicker action should be taken; and, failing the first plan, which he favoured most, then the alternative of carrying Spion Kop by a night attack. However this may be, the fiat went forth that Spion Kop, which commanded the road to Ladysmith by Fair View and Groote, was to be carried by an assault at night, and the road secured for the passage of the Natal army.

On January 23rd, 1900, Sir R Buller telegraphed to the Secretary of State that an attempt would be made that night to seize Spion Kop. The officer who was, in the first instance, selected to command the column was Major-General Talbot Coke, who made the very natural request that the attack should be delayed twenty-four hours to give him time to reconnoiter the ground with the officers commanding regiments.

In the meanwhile, Sir Redvers Buller, owing to the lameness of General Talbot Coke, suggested that the command should be entrusted to General Woodgate, the commander of the Lancashire Brigade, with whom Lieutenant-Colonel Blomfield had an interview at mid-day on the 23rd, when he was informed “that Spion Kop was to be taken that night, and that the General must have tried troops for such a hazardous operation,” the Lancashire Fusiliers being selected to lead the way.

At 3.40 pm Colonel Blomfield received the following orders from the Brigade Major:

1. The GOC has decided to seize Spion Kop this night. The following troops will compose the force:

   • Royal Lancaster Regiment (6 companies)
   • 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers
   • 180 of Thorneycroft’s MI
   • Half Company of 17th Company RE
2. The above troops will rendezvous at White’s Farm, about half a mile NE of Pontoon Bridge, at seven pm.
3. Extra ammunition will be carried on the mules supplied by the 10th Brigade.
4. One day’s complete rations to be carried. Waggons with supplies of great coats will be brought up as soon as possible without exposure; also water carts and machine guns.
5. The S Lan Regt will hand over six mules, three to each battalion, for water carrying purposes.
6. Pack mules will be utilised for carrying water in waterproof sheets.
7. 20 picks and 20 shovels to be carried in regulation stretchers.
8. Password, “Waterloo.”

It should be observed that No 3 was modified later, and the rendezvous changed to a spot north of White’s Farm, and that No 7 was quite impossible of fulfillment, waterproof sheets being useless as water bags, and biscuit tins were tried as improvised water tanks. They were not a success. The steep climb up the mountain tilted the boxes to all sorts of angles, and though the tops were covered with wood and canvas, there was not much water left when the hill was finished. As the battalion was formed up to leave the bivouac at dusk, Colonel Blomfield addressed the men in a few soldierly words, praising them for their conduct and steadiness in the actions of the previous days, particularly on the 20th, telling them of the General’s confidence in them, which was freely shared by himself and the officers, and warning them of the dangerous nature of the service upon which they were about to be engaged, which he assured them he knew would but prove their high qualities.

The battalion reached the rendezvous at half-past eight, and there met the rest of the column, with the addition of two companies of the South Lancashire Regiment, which were sent to make up the strength of the Royal Lancaster Regiment, who had only six companies.

Colonel Thorneycroft had seen the eastern and western sides of Spion Kop, and he had on that day noted the physical features of the southern side, and any land marks that would be of guidance to a column groping in the dark. He was assisted in leading the column by Captain C M Brunker, Lancashire Fusiliers, Lieutenants Farquhar and Forbes and a few men of Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry. There were also two native guides, but one vanished in the darkness, and the second had no knowledge, or pretended to have none, of the mountain. The guides were never seen by Colonel Thorneycroft. No officer or soldier, Colonial or Imperial, in General Buller’s army had ever been up Spion Kop, and there was no reliable plan or map to assist the column in its night’s march. Yet it was in our territory of Natal, and within twenty miles of the garrison of Ladysmith. From Ladysmith or Maritzburg many young officers might, and should, have been sent to have mapped the country in the days ere war was declared.

It is this parsimonious, this mistaken economy, that causes the majority of officers to have no practical interest in the financial affairs of the army.

In the darkness, the dim light of the stars being shrouded by a heavy drizzling rain, the column moved forward, Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry leading, then the Lancashire Fusiliers, with General Woodgate at their head, followed by six companies of the Royal Lancaster Regiment, two companies of the South Lancashire, and half of the 17th Company Royal Engineers, the ammunition mules, bearers, etc, bringing up the rear. The column marched across the valley in an easterly direction, by a mere track, which forced them into single file, and this formation rendered frequent halts necessary to allow those in rear to close up.

When the valley was cleared the ascent began, and the column was in fours. Colonel Thorneycroft led them over the Kaffir paths leading to the kraals. These kraals were beyond the dongas and the broken ground at the base of the hill, but standing on the hill itself were the first and most important land marks. The kraals were passed between eleven o’clock and midnight. The column was moving slowly upwards over the broken ground, men were stumbling over the huge boulders which lay hidden from view in the darkness of the night, and the heavy mist which increased in density as they ascended. Often they were on their hands and knees groping their way. The silence was never broken, and the patience of the men as they toiled upwards was admirable. The halts which were constantly made to allow Colonel Thorneycroft to go on ahead and ascertain the route, and to try and peer through the darkness, gave the toiling soldiers welcome pauses, and short but useful breathing rests.

The second land mark which told Colonel Thorneycroft that he was leading the column straight was a clump of trees. The Colonel with Captain Brunker and a few others pushed on ahead to a second clump. They returned, and again the column was in motion, not a sound being heard but the tramp of the feet over the stony ground, and an occasional whispered order.

The last land mark was reached - a green glacis and a belt of trees. These gave Colonel Thorneycroft the assurance that all was well, and that he had skillfully accomplished a difficult and dangerous duty. As soon as the head of the column touched the plateau the men were quickly formed into double companies, but in single rank, with intervals of one hundred yards between the companies. Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry was in front, then the Lancashire Fusiliers, with C and E companies leading. The object of this wide front was to thoroughly search the ground for the Boer garrison. Slowly and silently they moved forward with bayonets fixed, every man being conscious that a supreme moment in his life was at hand. The wind blew the mist in their faces and the sound away from the sleeping Dutchmen. The tramp of the feet and the distant barking of some dogs alone broke the stillness of the morning.

Within a few minutes off four o’clock, a loud, hoarse voice shouted, “Wi kom dar,” and at once a heavy, but ill-directed fire was opened in the direction of the column. In compliance with orders previously issued, every man threw himself to the ground, and as soon as the fire slackened, in a deep tone of voice, believed to be that of General Woodgate, was heard the password “Waterloo.” This sent the whole column forward at a charge, each man giving vent to his pent up feelings in a fierce, angry, war-like shout, the battle cry that never yet was heard in vain. Lieutenant Awdry, outrunning the men of his company, and getting in advance of the whole column, bayoneted a burly Boer who had failed to make his escape. Awdry was a youth of only twenty-four summers, but great physical strength, and he cast the huge body of the Dutchman from him as if he were a figure of straw. The summit was carried with but little opposition and only three casualties. The cheers that announced the fact to the watchers along the banks of the Tugela were answered by a shower of star shells. The seventy-five men of the Vryheid commando, who had for the three weeks previously formed the Boer garrison on Spion Kop, fled from the immediate vicinity of the plateau, but only to take up other positions which they well knew, and there to wait and see what the dawn would bring forth. It was now four o’clock on Wednesday, January 24th, and the first imperative necessity was to in trench the whole force. The column advanced, but the mist, which had befriended them so far, hid from view the physical features of the plateau, the extent of its perimeter, and the salient points of the surrounding hills. Indeed, it now favored the enemy in the same way as it had befriended us. It covered the advance of their reinforcements to the positions allotted to them. In the impenetrable darkness the Royal Engineers laid a trace. Rocks, stones, and earth were placed upon this by the tired soldiers. The labour of digging and clearing the ground was immense, the in trenching tools were useless for work on the stone-bound surface, while the direction of the trenches was left to chance, for no one could tell how they should face. Its plateau was found to be 500 yards long, while in its broadest part it was 900 yards.

The position of the companies was in the front line from right to left.

C. Captain Tidswell, Lieutenant Mallock, and Fraser.
G. Captain Stewart, Lieutenant Allardyce.
F. Captain Whyte, Lieutenant Campbell.
A. Major Walter.
On Major Walter’s left was Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry.
In a rough echelon in rear of the front line, again from right to left, were:
B. Captain Ormond, Lieutenant Charlton.
D. Captain Freeth, Lieutenants Awdry and Hastings.
E. Captain Elmslie, Lieutenant R S Wilson.
H. Captain Hicks, Lieutenant Griffin.

In contour the summit is roughly triangular, the most acute angle being to the south-west. This part is somewhat higher than the rest, and is hog backed in shape. It was here the trenches were made, and their length from end to end did not exceed 300 yards. To the Lancashire Fusiliers was allotted the right, the detachment of Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry occupied the centre, while the Royal Lancasters were on the left. The trenches of the 2nd Battalion lay, roughly speaking, from south-east to north-west. C Company under Captain Tidswell was on the right, and this was the extreme right of the British position.

Among the officers there was the very natural belief that the seizure of Spion Kop was only the first and primary move in the final onward march of the army, and that the whole Boer position would simultaneously be threatened, if not attacked and carried; that this one fragment of 1,600 men should be cast upon the mountain-top to face the brunt of an attack from the whole Boer army did not enter into their calculations. The mist, dense and impenetrable, caused the column to occupy the worst possible position for defending the summit. The trench was made on a line drawn by the Royal Engineers in the mist. When the mist lifted a little at 6.30 am, the sappers were sent out with a covering party to entrench the outer perimeter, but this they were unable to do, as the Boers crept up and fired. It at once became evident that the little wall and entrenchment afforded no adequate field of fire. Detachments were sent out to the further crest in front: forty men under Captain Bettington and Lieutenant Grenfell, TMI, going to the left, while Captain Petre, Lieutenants Flower-Ellis and Knox-Gore, also of TMI, took up a position on the left front. At the same time parties of the 2nd Battalion went out to the right and right front.

Chief among those who hurried up to re-take Spion Kop in the early dawn of that Wednesday morning was the Carolina commando, numbering some five hundred men, and reckoned to be among the best of the Boer army, while they were led by Commandant Prinsloo, one of the ablest of the Boer Commanders. These were the men who at the short ranges, as soon as the mist cleared away, poured in a constant and deadly fire from the right front and left front. On the right front (C Company) they had the most control. Upon the hundred yards of trench, from the right where this company was stationed, was concentrated the main portion of the Boer fire, and for the greater part at short ranges from 80 to 100 yards.

The next surprise that awaited the defenders was the fire of a pom-pom from the north-west, and a second fire from the north-east. Before we deal with the terrible fight that was now developing, let us consider the value of Spion Kop to either of the belligerent forces. The Boers had every opportunity of estimating its value both for offence or defence; beyond holding it in a weak way they did nothing. It was only a link in their chain. They knew that from its summit guns could not be used; and, commanding position that it seemed to be, they realised that it was untenable. To the side that could hold it with artillery victory was assured. For the British it would cut the Boer line in two, and open up that sixteen miles of plain which lay between it and Ladysmith. If the Boers held it, which they would have done had they not known that it could be dominated by the adjacent ranges, futile indeed would have been the efforts of the British on the Dutch position from Acton Holmes to Brakfontein. But Woodgate’s column, having secured the mountain top, naturally thought that they would hold the key of the position while the army that lay around them on the banks of the Tugela would make a general attack on the contiguous heights. This would have rendered the task of the column comparatively light. But until the afternoon no effectual effort was made to reach the Boers from any other point. With drawn breath and anxious eyes the army watched the combat. The heavy clouds of sulfurous smoke, which lay like a pall over the mountain top, seemed to silhouette the pigmy-like figures of the men who were holding it under an inferno of fire. Now and then they could see a small party rushing forward, only to surge back in fearfully reduced numbers. The message was flashed, asking for help, but only to meet with the response later in the day of pouring more lives into the shambles. Still the commanders watched the unequal struggle, while suggestions passed between them, and the army for the most part remained in a state of aimless inertia.

Between seven and eight o’clock the mists cleared away and the sun shed its rays with a scorching mercilessness that was not surpassed on any day in the year excepting on the day of Colenso, when the heat was abnormally intense, even for South Africa, on that small, narrow plateau. Then for the first time was revealed to them that the true crest was from eighty to a hundred yards lower down. The Engineers endeavored to in trench the crest; but the heavy and accurate fire of the Boers compelled them to return to the trench. The Boers could now be distinctly seen coming up the northern slopes of Spion Kop some three thousand yards away.

About eight o’clock General Woodgate passed along the entrenchments of the 2nd Battalion, his peculiar gait making him easily recognisable. The officers lay together in groups as he passed. Captains Walter and Brunker and Lieutenant Awdry were in rear of the left of the battalion and the nearest to Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry. At half-past eight o’clock Colonel Blomfield observed a large party of Boers coming along a path, and he personally reported the fact to General Woodgate, who walked back with him to the spot from which he saw them. As they were watching the path, the General was shot through the head above the right eye. He was carried to the dressing station on an improvised stretcher of great coats and rifles by men of the regiment, under a searching fire, which never seemed for an instant to leave them, as, no doubt, the little group moving in the open was too good a mark to be resisted by the Boers, and Private McGuirk was the first to be seriously wounded. Colour-Sergeant Potter and Sergeant Farrell covered the party as they moved towards the dressing station, when the former excellent non-commissioned officer was killed. Both were awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Colonel Blomfield at once informed Colonel Crofton, Royal Lancaster Regiment, the officer next in seniority to General Woodgate, that the latter was wounded, and as he was passing along the line of the trenches he ordered Major Walter to take his company and clear the front, for the Colonel was strongly of opinion that General Woodgate was shot by a sniper from a short range. Major Walter jumped over the entrenchment, and ordered the front rank to follow him in single file from the left. He then advanced about one hundred yards, directing his men to take cover behind a well defined line of stones. This brought him to within a few yards of the true crest of the hill. From the trench to the crest line was a gentle slope, and thence a precipitous descent to the Nek below. This advance was seen by the Boers, and it drew upon the small party what has been expressively, but accurately, described as a “hellish fire.” The summer sun had by this time entirely dissipated the mist, and in the glare of its scorching rays Major Walter could now discern the Boer trenches, not less than one thousand yards distant. Upon these he directed his own and the fire of his men, but the enemy were invisible. In a few minutes he was shot through the leg. His party was ordered to retire, and he drew himself along the ground, by the aid of stones and tufts of grass, until he was very gallantly rescued by some men of the Natal Volunteer Ambulance corps. In the meanwhile, Colonel Blomfield having personally made known to Colonel Crofton the fall of the General, and asked if there were any instructions for his battalion, Colonel Crofton replied no, but that he should signal down and say, “Hard pressed and need reinforcements.”

By nine o’clock the enemy had our range to a yard. The plateau of Spion Kop is connected by a long neck with a steep, rocky knoll, which is 800 yards distant in a direct line from our trenches. Along the steep sides of this neck, and of the sides of Spion Kop itself, the Boers were able to creep unperceived. No man could attempt to look over and live, far less expose himself. As Captain Tidswell fixed his bayonet, the blade flashed above the trench. He was immediately wounded in the neck by a splinter that glanced off his bayonet. From their trenches on the knoll, from the crest line where they were in complete cover, from Green Hill, and from the Brakfontein side, the Burghers brought an intense and concentrated fire upon the British.

As early as 7.45 am, the plateau had been searched by the fire of three guns and a Vickers-Maxim, from the north-west, at a range of three thousand yards. They were placed in this position to stop any force attempting to get through by the Trichardt’s Drift road, but heavy was the toll they took on Spion Kop.

The navel guns on “Gun Hill” close to Potgieter’s Drift endeavored to silence the Boer guns on Green Hill, but their shell flew harmlessly over the Boer position.

All this time, though in the agony of a mortal would, General Woodgate lay conscious.

About ten am he sent his last message to General Warren. It ran:

"We are between a terrible cross-fire and can barely hold our own. Water is badly needed. Help us.”

At the word “cross-fire” the heliograph was smashed by a shell, but the signaler continued and finished the message with a flag. No message could more forcibly express the condition of the column.

Half an hour later, his successor in the command, Colonel Crofton, ordered the following message to be sent, which was in substance what he had told Colonel Blomfield he would send: “General Woodgate killed; reinforcements urgently needed.”

About 10.30 am, as Colonel Blomfield was walking up to the trench held by C Company, he was wounded by a mauser bullet, which passed through his right shoulder, and knocked him to the ground. Captain Tidswell and Sergeant Lightfoot, of C Company, from their trench some thirty yards off, saw the Colonel fall, and, “in the most gallant manner,” but by no means un-common on that mountain, they ran out and brought their commanding officer into their trench.

There were at different times during the day small detached parties holding, with the desperate tenacity of a rare valour, the crest line to the right and left front of the main trench. The Boers were almost invisible. They could at times be heard speaking when they could not be seen. Their close proximity was unknown until, as if by accident, the rifles of our men touched them at the opposite side of a rock. But the majority were, from their “coigns of vantage,” able to pour in such a destructive fire that no man could expose himself for a single instant and survive. Those in the entrenchments heard the frenzied cries for reinforcements from their comrades on the crest line. Our left was threatened by the Boers, who would, should they succeed, be able to enfilade the advanced parties.

Lieutenant Sergeant, of the Indian Staff Corps (formerly of the 2nd Battalion), who was serving as a volunteer with Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, was ordered to take twenty men of his company, rush out and hold these rocks. Sergeant and his men ran to the appointed place, but only for a brief space of time could they hold it, though they were only separated from the enemy by a few paces. From the left such a perfect stream of fire was poured into this handful of men that Lieutenant Sergeant was compelled, when half of his men were killed or wounded, to return to the supports in the breastwork. The Boers immediately occupied the rocks, and brought such destructive cross-fire to bear on the men on the right of the crest line that their position would soon have been untenable.

To avert this, Colonel Thorneycroft at once determined to deliver a counter-stroke. He called upon every man left in the entrenchment, where he commanded, to charge with him. All that remained in that particular spot of his own corps was twenty men; intermixed with them were twenty of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and with this valiant little band of forty, he crossed from the trench to the rocks beyond. The ordeal of fire through which they passed was so great that the bravest staggered before it, threw themselves to the ground in the centre of the fire-swept zone, and fired. The attack did relieve for a few moments the pressure on the right of the position; for Thorneycroft and his forty had now turned upon them the whole Boer fire from the right, left, and front. Human beings could not stand before it, and all that was left of the forty returned to the trench. We do not know how many they numbered, but that any should have survived that desperate effort, and that their giant commander should have escaped untouched, was little short of the miraculous. As they crossed the open ground from the trench, their attention was drawn by some one shouting on their left, where there was a small group of three officers. Captain Knox-Gore and Lieutenant Flower-Ellis were standing behind a rock on the crest line; close to them Lieutenant Newnham, of the Indian Staff Corps (all three of Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry) who like Sergeant began his military career in the 2nd Battalion, was sitting down, propped up against a rock, having been twice wounded, and with his life blood slowly oozing away. Calmly smoking a cigarette, and with a stoical indifference to impending death, he continued to fire until a third bullet released him from his sufferings and ended his gallant life. Knox-Gore and Flower-Ellis were now alone in the midst of the bodies of their men, trying to suppress the flanking fire which had destroyed them. In a short time both lay with their men and Newnham in the stillness of death, and nothing remains but the example of their heroism.

By this time the men of the three corps in the main trench were intermingled. A messenger ran to the trench where Colonel Thorneycroft lay, presumably with the intelligence that he had been appointed a temporary Brigadier-General for the purpose of commanding the troops on the summit of Spion Kop, but before he could utter the words he fell dead at the Colonel’s feet. It was about this period of the fight that Lieutenant Awdry went to reinforce the right with a section of “D” Company. With some of his men he moved out in advance, and how he fell is one of the mysteries of this intricate battle. For a month his name remained among the “missing,” the hope being cherished that he was a prisoner, as no one could say that they had seen him after his departure from his original position in the lines of the defence. He had frequently left the trenches to bring in wounded, and though reliable corroborative testimony as to the manner of his death is not forthcoming, still there is no doubt that he was slain on Spion Kop, in his twenty-fifth year, and within a month of completing his fifth year’s service in the Lancashire Fusiliers. His great physical strength was surpassed by his daring spirit, which was supported by the inflexible probity of a high-toned mind. Wounded in an earlier fight, he bound the wound and refused to leave the ranks, and was the foremost in the fray, with a gallantry that could have graced a Knight in the age of chivalry.

A second section of “D” Company was led out in advance of the main trench by Lieutenant Hastings, under the personal direction of the Brigade Major (Virtue), who was killed before they had gone very far, and Lieutenant Hastings and Sergeant MacDonald were forced by the heavy fire to fall back to the trench. Hastings, hearing that something had happened to Awdry, went to that part of the trench where he supposed his friend to be, but he failed to find him, nor could he obtain any intelligence concerning him, and while he was making his enquiries the Boers succeeded in getting into the trench, and our men were, for the moment, forced to fall back, but they soon drove the Boers from the trench and resumed their occupation of it.

At this juncture the Captain of the Company (Freeth) was leading another section to the front trench, when he came into a depression of the ground which gave but little view of the front, but in cover it was equal to the trenches, which were congested with dead and wounded; but soon the section was reduced to five or six men, and Captain Freeth was struck with something, probably by a stone, and rendered senseless. When consciousness returned, the firing had ceased, and looking about to see what had happened, he found himself surrounded by the enemy, who at once made him a prisoner.

The long hours of the morning had passed slowly for those who continued to hold the position. Our losses were heavy. The trenches were encumbered with the dead, the dying, and the wounded. By noon it seemed as if there was no hope of assistance from below. The concentrated efforts of the whole Boer army were now turned upon that few hundred yards of breast work. Not interfered with, or even threatened at any point in the line of their entrenchments, the Boers were free to pour out all their wrath upon Woodgate’s adventurous column. Shrapnel and pom-pom shells raked and scorched the plateau from end to end. Rifle fire continued without a moment’s cessation from the Knoll, from Gun Hill, from the slopes of the Brakfontein ridges, and from the crest line. Never have soldiers been compelled to lie under such a concentrated and accurate fire from Maxim-Nordenfeldts, Maxim-Vickers, guns and rifles.

The trench did not, except at one point, exceed a depth of two feet six inches, and in some places it was less. Against shrapnel this was no protection. There were no loop-holes, and the trench was of little protection from a front and enfilading fire at close ranges, varying from 80 to 150 yards. At this hour the Boers had on the crest line and on the steep sides of Spion Kop five hundred men, and they now determined to close in on our right and centre. It was about 1.30 o’clock when they put into execution a ruse in which they excelled. A number of them walked towards the trench with their rifles slung, while those in front waved white handkerchiefs, and it was under cover of this audacious act that they got sufficient men into the trench to secure the defenders, who were without officers, and, it is stated, short of ammunition. It was the crisis in the fight: the moment when the best soldiers need the leading of their officers; and when we think of the fire to which they were exposed, that they held the most unprotected part of the position, the horrors of the trench, and the frenzy from want of water, who will be found to blame those who fell victims to a ruse put into execution with all the cunning and daring for which the Boer is remarkable? It was during this incident that Colonel Thorneycroft rushed to the spot, and in a loud, angry voice shouted: “I’m the Commandant here; take your men back to hell, sir; there’s no surrender.” Other men who were sent out to the true crest line, “to get a better field of fire,” fell into the hands of the Boers who were lying in strength in the depression below.

To prevent any discussion with the Boers, Colonel Thorneycroft led the men who were with him to the rocks in rear of our trenches and above the dressing station. As they went the Boers fired upon them, but from this position Thorneycroft’s men could sweep the whole plateau with their fire. At this moment, which must have been about two o’clock, the first reinforcement, a company of the Middlesex Regiment, gained the top of the hill. Shouting to his company and the men who were with him, Colonel Thorneycroft charged with the whole across the plateau and re-occupied the entrenchment The reinforcements of the Middlesex were distributed as they were most needed.

The whole situation was clearly reviewed by Colonel Thorneycroft in a concise message which he sent to General Warren:

Spion Kop, 2.30 pm
From Colonel Thorneycroft to General Sir C Warren
“Hung on till the last extremity with the old force. Some of the Middlesex are here now, and I have the Dorsets coming up, but the force is really inadequate to hold so large a perimeter. The enemy’s guns to the north-west sweep the whole of the top of the hill; they also have guns to east. Cannot you bring artillery fire to bear on the north-west guns? What reinforcements can you send to hold the hill to-night? We are badly in need of water. There are many killed and wounded. If you wish to really make a certainty of the hill for the night, you must send more infantry, and attack the enemy’s guns.”

Soon after the Middlesex entered the fight, the Boers made another attempt to procure the surrender of our men by walking towards the trench with their rifles slung, as if they themselves wished to submit. This is typical of their tactics on too many occasions during the campaign, and the cool audacity with which it was carried out often ensured its success by disarming suspicion. In this instance, the particulars are best related by Major Savile, of the Middlesex Regiment, who was in command of an adjacent trench.

The only troops actually close to me were a party of the Lancashire Fusiliers inside a schanze; ‘F’ company of other troops. A good many shells from the big guns burst near us, and a Lance-Corporal of the Fusiliers was killed. The only point I could see rifle-fire proceeding from was a trench, the third, I believe, occupied by our troops on the right. Presently I heard a great deal of shouting from this trench, where there were about fifty men. They were calling for reinforcements, and shouting “The Boers are coming up.” Two or three minutes afterwards I saw a party of about forty Boers walking towards this trench. They came up quite coolly; most of them had their rifles slung, and all, so far as I could observe, had their hands up.

“Our men in the trench - they were Fusiliers - were then standing up also, with their hands up, and shouting ‘The Boers are giving in’! ‘The Boers are giving in’! I did not know what to think, but ordered a company of my regiment to fix bayonets. Just then, when the Boers were close to the trench, someone - whether an enemy or one of our men - fired a shot. In an instant there was a mêlée. We were fighting hand to hand. I shot the Boer, and he dropped, clinging, however, to his rifle as he fell, and covering me most carefully. He fired and I fell. Subsequently to my being hit, parties of Boers passed over me, trying on the same trick, holding up their hands as if they were asking for quarter. But our men refused to be taken in again, and fired, killing and driving them back.”

The losses to both sides in this fight at close quarters are not known; but those who witnessed it say that they were heavy, and the occurrence as related by Major Savile is corroborated by Captain Tidswell, by whom it was witnessed.

The Boers now realised that it was impossible to drive the British from the summit. If we were compelled to retire from the entrenchment we had a better position to fall back on, in the huge boulders which lay above the dressing station, which would afford us a good field of fire. They now resolved to shell our men off the hill-top. So, from all their sheltered positions, a perfect tornado of shell fire was poured on the hill-top, and maintained from three pm till the shades of evening mercifully interposed. At other places their shrapnel failed, the soft ground nullifying its effect, but the rock-bound summit of Spion Kop suited the percussion shrapnel of the Boers, which was accurately laid and swept the whole plateau with deadly effect.

The Scottish Rifles reached the hill about three o’clock, and were distributed as required to strengthen the entrenchments.

Between three and four o’clock the Boers increased their artillery by two guns and one pom-pom on the Brakfontein side, and thus raked the plateau from east and west, and enfiladed the trenches. For the next two and a half hours shells fell on Spion Kop at the rate of from seven to ten in a minute. Their rifle fire never languished, but their great hope was to drive the British off the summit by shell fire. In this, unfortunately, and it is sad to relate, our own artillery aided them by dropping shrapnel on the summit.

Throughout the day the men were frequently supplied with ammunition, but at different periods there was a scarcity in some of the advanced trenches.

The long summer day, with its intense heat, was drawing to a close, but not the merciless fire of the enemy. At half-past six o’clock Colonel Thorneycroft sent the last despatch of the day to General Warren:

“The troops which marched up here last night are quite done up (the Lancashire Fusiliers, Royal Lancaster Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry). They have had no water, and ammunition is running short. I consider that even with the reinforcements which have arrived it is impossible to permanently hold this place so long as the enemy’s guns can play on the hill. They have three long range guns, three of shorter range, and several Maxim-Nordenfeldts, which have swept the whole plateau since eight am. I have not been able to ascertain the casualties, but they have been very heavy, especially in the regiments which came up last night. I request instructions as to what course I am to adopt. The enemy are now (6.30) firing heavily from bot flanks (rifle, shell and Nordenfeldt), while a heavy rifle fire is being kept up on the front. It is all I can do to hold my own. If my casualties go on at the present rate I shall barely hold out the night. A large number of stretcher bearers should be sent up, and also all the water possible. The situation is critical.”

Thus wrote the officer by whose intrepid example and ready resource our position was sustained. And never was an officer better supported. All that the best soldiers could do, all that they could give they gave throughout that long and trying day. The surrenders that did take place in no wise took from the gallantry of all, in the mass or individually. Without officers in the front trenches, their commander continued the struggle until after 10 pm. He waited for orders or directions as to what he should do; he waited for replies to his despatches; he waited to see if he was to be assisted or relieved by a fresh force; if ammunition, water, and food were to be sent for his men, whose strength was exhausted. After ten o’clock, probably near eleven, Colonel Thorneycroft summoned the senior officers to what was practically a council of war.

In the dark, and in the hollow near the “dressing station” they assembled; in duration their meeting did not exceed five minutes. The unanimous opinion of all present was, that it was impossible to hold the hill. Colonel Thorneycroft decided to evacuate the position. At eleven o’clock the retirement began. The survivors were formed up near the dressing station and were marched off in regular formation. The men of the Lancashire Fusiliers had no sleep for forty-eight hours. They had been without water, and some without food, on that fatal Wednesday, under a burning sun, and a nerve-shattering shell-fire, and distressingly accurate rifle-fire. The agonies of the dying and wounded during that day no one could ever know - the awful consuming thirst in the narrow, shallow, and crowded trench, without their comrades being able to give them the smallest succor or alleviation. When ordered to leave the trenches, the difficulty, the harrowing difficulty of the few surviving officers, was to know who was dead and who was asleep, or insensible from sheer physical exhaustion. Many of the wounded remained, as it was impossible to remove them. Some were killed as they lay asleep in the trench, many as they left it. Of the latter, Sergeant Lightfoot, who so bravely assisted Colonel Blomfield when wounded, was one.

The battalion, but only half, little better than a fragment of those who toiled up the mountain side on the previous night, made their way down again, while of those who returned the vast majority had only escaped being wounded by a hair’s breadth. Their clothing and appointments bore the marks of bullets, and as evidence of the accuracy of the enemy’s shooting, the helmets were pierced by the Mauser pellets, and Sir Redvers Buller did them but justice when he “bore testimony to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops" the endurance shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, Middlesex Regiment, Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, were admirable.

The sights in the trenches were so ghastly as to unnerve the strongest. The mangled and maimed body of a wounded comrade was frequently more distressing than that of a dead friend who was killed instantaneously, and the piteous moan for water that could not be given must have been harrowing. The effect of this battle was sufficient to show the extent and nature of the unequal struggle.

All were stunned and stupefied, while some spoke and acted as if they were in a state of morose drunkenness, and certainly they had not tasted strong drink. Others were suffering from nervous prostration, with agonies of intense pain, and yet they were unwounded when examined by the medical officer. Some who passed through it unscathed cannot give a single incident connected with their experience. Comrades on their right and left were shot beside them, still they cannot say how they died or the approximate hour.

Two officers went into action with the same company, but they never saw each other again after the mists were raised, and the sun shone with unusual warmth on that fatal hill.

On the day following the fight, our men sat among the piles of arms in the bivouac near Wright’s Farm immovable, like a number of statues. They had no desire to hold conversation with any man, and had but little to eat, even at 11 am when food was first supplied; all they longed for was undisturbed rest.

And those who lay on that hill top, never to return, and who by their death “splendidly maintained the best traditions of the British Army,” were:

Captains C H Hicks, G M Stewart, V H A Awdry; Lieutenants J J R Mallock and E Fraser
Colour-Sergeants J Potter, A Shoebotham, W Wainwright
Sergeants F Cass, R Lightfoot; Sergeant-Drummer T Brown
Corporals A T Allen, J Heaton, J King, T Lunn, S Leighton
Lance-Corporal J Concannon
Drummers R Gregg, R Hudson; Privates W Booth, J Brady, W Ballard, R Barlow, J Burke, W Binns, M Canney, B Coop, F Connelly, J Crosby, A Davies, P Delaney, R Eaves, A Friars, M Green, G Green, W Gill, F Greenwood, F Homer, C Hillyard, W Hands, J Hayes, J Henry, J Heyes, J Lee, W McCormac, C Marchington, G Miller, F Moulton, J Moores, J O’Hara, F Pratt, F Pollitt, J Roberts, J Royles, J Rushman, W Swales, A Street, T Stenson, J Whitehead, C Whitehead.

Died of wounds -

Lance-Corporal T Powell
Privates E Brazier, G Henderson, A Houltram, J Cavanagh, A Kay, T Margerison, S Openshaw, T Pendlebury, T Robinson, W Beckford, J Greenhalgh.

Severely wounded -

Lieutenant-Colonel C J Blomfield
Captain W F Elmslie
Brevet-Major W F Walter
Lieutenants C J Griffin, R S Wilson.

Slightly wounded -

Captain H V S Ormond, Lieutenant D Campbell.

In addition to the foregoing, one hundred and fifty-eight NCOs and privates were wounded, and a large proportion of the prisoners, who are not included in these numbers.

Colonel Blomfield had been wounded (shot through the shoulder) early in the morning, and lay in the trench, faint from loss of blood. In the evening he promised some of the wounded who were unable to walk that he would go for an ambulance, and in the darkness he took the wrong direction, and at dawn on the 25th, he found himself among some Boers who made him a prisoner. Here he was joined by Captain Elmslie (wounded in the shoulder, forearm, and scarred in the head), and ten wounded men. Captain Elmslie was very indignant that he was made a prisoner, as General Louis Botha had given orders that he and the men were to be handed over to the British ambulance, and not made prisoners. When General Botha left, the next officer in authority refused to obey the orders of the General in command, and Captain Elmslie was sent to Pretoria. The third officer taken prisoner was Captain Freeth.

At half-past eleven o’clock, and after the troops had begun their retirement, Lieutenant Winston Churchill, South African Light Horse, brought the first and only message received by Colonel Thorneycroft. No counsel, order, advice or instruction had he received from a superior officer throughout that long summer’s day. And now when a responsible messenger did come he was the bearer of a brief enquiry, only asking for his view on the situation, and what he would recommend should be done to defend the hill. It was too late. It is not within the scope of a regimental history to enter into the controversies that have raged over the retirement from Spion Kop, but events of that day and the whole subject render it necessary that the opinions of those who held that mountain top should be recorded. It is indisputable from the losses of the day alone, that against the fire that played on the summit from morn to eve of the 24th no guns could have remained in action for ten minutes. During the night the defenders could have improved the trenches and erected schanzes, but the distressing work of burying the dead and removing the wounded would have occupied most of the intervening hours till morning broke. But unless the Boers were attacked in their positions, and their attention drawn from Spion Kop, how long could the defences have withstood the fire of another day such as that of the 24th? Then there is the question of water. It is outside the range of doubt, but that the troops were without water. The Medical Officer in charge of the dressing station states unequivocally, that he had not, during any hour of the 24th, sufficient water for the wounded on Spion Kop. The dressing station was close to the path, the only one by which water could be brought. The first place to be served would be the dressing station. Every officer and man on Spion Kop, from General Woodgate downwards, craved for water. The survivors have all repudiated with natural heat the assertion, or rather the statements implying, that they had water. This would have been remedied for the 25th.

Turning to the effect the day’s fighting had on the Boers and their General, there is evidence that Louis Botha was disappointed, if not depressed, at the tenacity with which our men clung to the hill-top, and the losses inflicted on the Boers. This was accentuated when he received word from General Burger that the King’s Royal Rifles had attacked him in his position on the eminences known as the Twin Peaks, that form the eastern spurs of Spion Kop. He had real cause for alarm when he heard that General Burger had retreated with unusual rapidity. He at once supported Burger, but the King’s Royal Rifles held their ground. Botha was far too astute a General not to consider every factor in the situation. Two small items of information nerved his resolution - The reported death of General Woodgate, and that the British were without water. This information had been drawn from prisoners, and was reported to Botha by his Chief of the Staff. To be free of impedimenta, he sent his waggons to the rear; and by half-past three on the morning of the 25th, every available man was summoned from Acton Homes, for a final and supreme effort. These reinforcements came streaming in early on the 25th, and their arrival, together with the guns taken from us at Nicholson’s Nek, were witnessed by Colonel Blomfield, as he was waiting at a farm on the north side of Spion Kop, to have his wound dressed. Botha had decided to render Spion Kop untenable.

There is no doubt the Boers who had attacked Spion Kop suffered loss, were exhausted and dispirited. But the main body remained practically intact behind their schanzes, and these were strengthened by those drawn that morning from Acton Homes. So, in the absence of anything like a combined general attack, or our Artillery endeavoring to reach the Boer guns, or the holding of the Twin Peaks, the retirement from Spion Kop saved an immense loss of life.

When General Botha learnt of the abandonment of the Twin Peaks he felt secure. His misgivings were dispelled. For the British this bright spot was obscured, and the gallantry and sacrifices of a distinguished regiment cast to the winds.

Such was Spion Kop, and the glory alone remains to the gallant regimental officers and the soldiers who trusted them, fought by their side, by whom they were so often succored when grievously wounded, and with whom so many found a common grave on Thaba Mjama (the black mountain).

Whether guns could have been taken up seems doubtful. Captain Hanwell, of the 78th Battery, R.F.A., had the utmost difficulty, with the help of four horses, in getting a light Maxim on to the top, and in his opinion, which was shared by other Artillery officers, the feat was an impossible one until the path had been prepared.

The retirement of the army across the Tugela on January 26th was the conclusion of General Buller’s second attempt to relieve Ladysmith, an operation which he considered ought to have succeeded. The natural depression which is always inseparable from an army when retreating, was intensified by the heavy losses on Spion Kop, and though the troops were not harassed by the Boers who clung so tenaciously to their fastness in the mountains, the misery of sitting under a drenching rain from ten o’clock on the night of the 26th until four o’clock on the 27th, deepened the gloom in the minds of the men, but at the same time gave to each a grim determination to succeed.

The following officers, non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned in despatches for their services in action from the 20th to 25th January, 1900, by General Sir C Warren, February 1st 1900 -

Captain O C Wooley-Dod, G H B Freeth
Lieutenant L E O Charlton
Privates F Lomax, J Turner, F Power, J Thomas.
Colour-Sergeant R T Potter (killed)
Sergeant T J Farrell

Recommended for conspicuous gallantry at Spion Kop by General Sir R Buller, despatch dated 30th March, 1900.

Privates F Lomax, J Turner, J Royle

In the same despatch he mentioned

Captain J N Whyte, H V S Ormond
Lieutenants V H A Awdry, A J Allardyce, D F Campbell; Corporal G White
Privates J Moody, R Hudson, A Jordan, G Pearson, J Ormesher, M Loone (killed), J Coldwell, A Ford, J Mockeridge, T Brennan.

Extract from “A History of the Lancashire Fusiliers” by Major B Smyth MVO

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